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Dear friends, it’s a pleasure to be here in Iowa. One of my 
childhood heroes has been visiting you all a lot lately. In my 
current job, it would be improper to speak his name or of my 
continued high regard for him and his willingness to speak 
seriously, candidly, and expertly about the important issues 
facing our nation. But if you think of my home state and if I 
tell you that he inspired my hairstyle, you just might make a 
pretty good guess. After all, each of you made the Journal. 
 As my chronological age has caught up with my hairline, I 
have become more uncertain about virtually everything. This 
convictional plasticity is, I admit, not entirely new. I’ve 
always been suspicious of absolutism and unexamined truths. 
 But my distrust of dogmatism has grown deeper during my 
career as a lawyer, nearly all of which has been spent in public 
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service. In that career, I have been fortunate. During my time 
in the political world, I was privileged to work for an 
electorally courageous and policy savvy governor, Thomas R. 
Carper of Delaware. Governor Carper was a new democrat before 
the term was invented, a fiscal conservative deeply committed to 
economic and educational opportunities for the poor. The secret 
of Governor, now Senator, Carper’s success is his willingness to 
eschew the politics of labels and to pursue progress through 
patient dialogue. As Governor Carper’s counsel and policy 
director, it was my job to help him bring democrats and 
republicans together around an aggressive agenda to, among other 
things, reform Delaware’s educational and welfare systems. 
Typical of Governor Carper, those reforms combined stringent 
accountability standards (which appealed to conservatives) and 
generous funding for new services (which appealed to liberals). 
The formulation and implementation of policies along those lines 
was challenging, as it required the affected constituencies to 
compromise long-held beliefs about means in order to advance 
common ends. But the inclusive manner in which Governor Carper 
proceeded earned him respect from the contending interests and 
enabled him to advance an agenda that addressed his most 
important objectives for our state. 
 When I was fortunate enough to join the Court of Chancery, 
one of my first assignments was to mediate a case pending before 
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Vice Chancellor Lamb. He knew that I had forged legislative 
policy deals for Governor Carper and thought I might have a 
knack for mediation. He was right to perceive that the 
achievement of political compromise and the successful mediation 
of lawsuits demand similar skills. Both require an understanding 
of the concept of face, the recognition that everyone must leave 
the process having preserved their dignity and self-respect. 
Likewise, both require that the person putting together the deal 
has a keen eye for where the concentric circles overlap and 
tries to build on the issues that draw the parties together 
rather than those that divide them.  
 The art of principled compromise requires thoughtful 
consideration of the contending arguments and a willingness to 
ponder new ways of doing business with an open mind. Listening 
is essential. Avoiding the easy use of words like “always” and 
“never” is crucial, lest self-drawn lines in the sand inhibit 
solomonic agreement. 
 But the political and litigation worlds are also similar in 
a more regrettable way. The incentives for those who deliver 
arguments in the political and litigation contexts often cut 
against these well-understood requirements for facilitating 
compromise. In the political context, advocates preach to the 
converted and shout over their adversaries. In the litigation 
context, advocates whose extremism in argument drives judges 
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crazy have lucrative practices because there are clients who 
believe that they are best served by rabid pit bulls. Too often, 
the voices that we hear the loudest are those who profit, not 
from solving problems through constructive engagement, but from 
fostering the righteous outrage of those who pay their bills.  
 Within the comfortably narrow ideological boundaries of our 
over 200-year-old republic, few of the key questions we confront 
today come in black or white. Yet, much of American public 
rhetoric is finger-painted in those colors for the pre-schoolers 
we citizens are assumed to be. The television talking head shows 
of today make the William F. Buckley John K. Gailbraith debates 
of the 1970s seem Aristotelian, both in substance and in age. 
Snarkasm from the paid talking heads, and canned bullet points 
from the elected officials, spew forth in a ceaseless, head ache 
creating cacophony. This style of argument has crept into 
litigation, and too many briefs eschew nouns and verbs for pages 
and pages of adjectival and adverbial assault.  
 Given these factors, it’s not surprising that the so-called 
corporate governance debate has many of these tired features. 
Exaggeration is the norm; conversation the exception. I have no 
intention today of characterizing the arguments of the 
contending forces, to summarize the relative perspectives of, 
for example, the Business Roundtable and the Council on 
Institutional Investors. 
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 Rather, my goal is a more constructive one that will put to 
use some of the modest skill I have developed in identifying 
areas of common concern that might draw together seemingly 
contending interests. In particular, I intend to focus on the 
common corporate governance interests of those who manage 
American corporations and those who labor at less elevated 
levels for those corporations. In doing so, I accept as a 
reality that management and labor now derive much more of their 
economic wealth than they used to from the equity they own in 
the corporations for whom they toil and the stock market more 
generally. Therefore, both management and labor share an 
interest in the vitality of American equity markets. At the same 
time, I also accept the notion that most American workers obtain 
the bulk of their wealth from their labor and that even most top 
American managers can trace their wealth (including the equity 
they have accumulated) to their labor as executives. Therefore, 
both management and labor might be thought to have more concern 
than trust fund babies or investment bankers do for the 
continued ability of American corporations to support domestic 
employment. Likewise, both management and labor are likely to 
view a public corporation as something more than a nexus of 
contracts, as more akin to a social institution that, albeit 
having the ultimate goal of producing profits for stockholders, 
also durably serves and exemplifies other societal values. In 
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particular, both management and labor recoil at the notion that 
a corporation’s worth can be summed up entirely by the current 
price the equity markets place on its stock, much less that the 
immediate demands of the stock market should thwart the long-
term pursuit of corporate growth.  
 With this crude overview in mind, I will divide the 
remainder of this address into two parts. The first will address 
some of the major factors that are buffeting American 
corporations, and putting pressure on both management and labor. 
The second part will identify some areas of common concern, 
which might fruitfully serve as a focal point for a constructive 
conversation between management and labor on mutually 
advantageous corporate governance initiatives that might be in 
the national interest. I’m going to dive in, starting with some 
of the key reasons public companies are taking a rough ride on 
top of life’s mosh pit right now. 
 
Forces Buffeting American Public Corporations 
Forced Capitalism 
 
Since the advent of capitalism, an ocean of ink has been 
spilled over the contending interests of capital and labor. In 
the early stages of capitalism, capital providers and the 
managerial class were virtually indistinguishable. As Berle and 
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Means most famously described, the emergence of the public 
corporation created a separation between the providers of 
capital (sometimes denominated in simple terms as owners) and 
those who managed public corporations. But for many decades it 
could be safely assumed that those at the top echelon of 
American corporations largely shared the interests of those who 
provided the capital. Neither the owners nor the managers were 
“labor,” and relatively few Americans owned material amounts of 
corporate equity. Defined benefit pension plans, social 
security, and bank saving accounts constituted the methods by 
which most working Americans sought to secure themselves in 
retirement. 
 As we know, those days are long gone. For most of you who 
go to work in the private sector, access to a defined benefit 
pension plan will not be an option. More likely, you will be 
provided with an employer-provided supplement to contributions 
you make to a 401(k) plan. In order to provide for yourself in 
retirement, you will be required to make monthly investments. If 
you are acting rationally, you will make consistent 
contributions, in up and down markets, and do so through 
intermediaries, who invest your money for you. If you are acting 
with the most rationality, you will invest in index funds, which 
hold broad baskets of securities and bonds reflecting the 
opportunities and risks faced by the market, recognizing that it 
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is nearly impossible to pursue an active trading strategy that 
will beat the market over time. 
 As a result of these changing dynamics, most ordinary 
Americans have little choice but to invest in the market. They 
are in essence “forced capitalists,” even though they continue 
to depend for their economic security on their ability to sell 
their labor and to have access to quality jobs. These forced 
capitalists—in whose number I count myself—invest primarily for 
two purposes, both of which are long-term in focus: to send 
their children to college and to provide for themselves in 
retirement. This class of investors has no interest in quarter-
to-quarter earnings fluctuations or gimmicks that deliver quick 
bursts of cash at the expense of sustainable growth. These 
investors want corporations to focus on fundamentally sound 
policies that generate durable earnings through the sale of 
high-quality products and services. Stock crashes and 
bankruptcies flowing from fraudulent and imprudent schemes to 
prop up stock prices cost these investors dearly, as their funds 
ride these issuers’ stocks down to zero, until the stocks are 
taken out of the relevant index.  
 For powerful reasons, this class of investors invests in 
the market primarily through intermediaries. It is these 
intermediaries, and not the forced capitalists, who determine 
how the capital of these investors is put to work and how the 
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mountain of shares owned for their benefit is used to influence 
the management of public corporations. Given the directional 
momentum of public policy in the United States and Europe, the 
inflow of funds from forced capitalists to these intermediaries 
is likely to continue to increase. 
 
Shrinking Equity Returns and the Mountains Of Money in the 
Markets 
 
Indeed, huge amounts of money are sloshing through the 
world’s equity markets. This and other factors have led to 
diminished return expectations for equity investors in general, 
and a corresponding interest in investing activities that 
promise outsized returns. 
 Interestingly, some of the demand for outsized returns has 
come from institutional investors—such as public pension funds—
facing actuarial risks because of underfunding and past 
investment mistakes. These investors hope that placing a portion 
of their portfolios in aggressive investments that promise high 
returns will help them close the gap. Also influential in this 
mix is the success some prominent investors—notably some of the 
Ivy League universities—have enjoyed by employing active 
investing strategies to produce returns that beat the overall 
market. 
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 Combined with the persistent irrationality of many 
investors, these factors have created a fertile environment for 
money managers raising capital on the promise of high returns. 
Oddly called “hedge funds”—a term rooted in the management of 
risk—a good number of these funds seek to generate super-sized 
returns by putting pressure on public companies to change their 
managerial policies. These funds are under pressure to generate 
short-term results, in no small measure because their investors 
only entrust their capital for some discrete number of years and 
because the managers take gobs of compensation up-front from the 
capital they deploy for their investors. Two relatively standard 
pressure plays, both of which have existed for decades if not 
generations, are common. 
 The first is to see if a public company can be put into 
play. Amusingly, this often involves action by activist hedge 
funds to encourage a public company to accept an acquisition by 
another class of money managers seeking outsized returns, the 
private equity funds. We’ll come back to them again later. 
 The other standard play is to encourage the public company 
to deliver some form of immediate value to its stockholders, 
through increased dividends or, even better from a hedge fund’s 
perspective, a hefty stock buy-back program. Often, the target 
must take on greater leverage or decrease its capital 
expenditures to fund these initiatives. The impact of such 
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initiatives upon short-term and long-term investors can be very 
different, as the benefits are immediate and the risks come to 
roost down the road.  
 
The Corporate Governance Industry 
 
Another factor contributes to the potency of activist 
investors—an odd new business sector. It is comprised of the 
strange admixture of public pension fund administrators, proxy 
advisory and corporate governance ratings organizations, 
corporate law scholars, and business journalists who profit in 
monetary and psychic ways from corporate governance tumult. To 
say that these folks profit from tumult is not a normative 
argument; it is a positive claim. 
 For many of these “corporate governance” experts, the 
peaceful generation of profits by public corporations would be 
disconcerting, as it would make their reason for existence 
suspect. For those public pension fund administrators who view 
themselves as watchdogs for investors, the generation of 
shareholder proposals serves to justify the costs invested in 
their employment. And the continued generation of such proposals 
helps the proxy advisory organizations, by making it even more 
attractive for money management firms to outsource their 
shareholder voting decisions to these organizations in order to 
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reduce costs and comply with ERISA mandates for informed voting 
(mandates that the corporate governance industry helped to 
stimulate in the first place!).  
 Corporate law scholars dig the tumult because shareholder 
activism gives them an opportunity to turn their ideas of the 
moment into shareholder proposals with a real-world, if 
putatively precatory, effect. As important, the business press 
loves a dust-up, and often turns to academics for stentorian 
quotes. All in all, it’s pretty heady stuff for otherwise 
obscure public pension fund administrators, employees at 
corporate governance ratings firms, and even Harvard professors 
to get to sound off in the Economist, Business Week, The Wall 
Street Journal, or the New York Times about the obstinance of a 
public company’s CEO and board of directors. 
 And, in fairness, the continuous stream of shareholder 
proposals has generated a good deal of business for management-
sided lawyers, proxy fight firms, and in-house corporate 
governance executives. These advisers help corporations address 
the proposals and, more proactively, manage their “relationship” 
with the corporate constituencies that generate them. Many of 
these management-side advisers have bought into the idea that 
“corporate governance” is an important end in itself, and have 
employed accommodationist strategies that implicitly validate 
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that notion and thereby the outside constituencies who advance 
shareholder proposals. 
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Academic and Journalistic Laziness 
As any American law student who has taken corporations 
knows, American corporate law scholarship since the New Deal has 
been preoccupied with addressing the agency costs that arise 
from the separation of ownership and control exemplified by 
public corporations. The laboratory rats for this aspect of 
social science continue to be operating corporations that make 
money by selling products and services. The inertial direction 
of this scholarship has, as a general matter, always been toward 
greater constraints on the discretion of corporate management 
and more direct influence by stockholders. As a normative 
matter, it is often argued that the stockholders, as the 
residual claimants of the corporation, are the group best able 
to keep management honest and focused on increasing the value of 
the corporation. Therefore, for many influential scholars, the 
more tools and the more opportunities stockholders have to 
influence corporate policies, the better. Restrictions on 
takeover defenses are not enough; there must be the opportunity 
to unseat directors without even nominating opposing candidates. 
Unseating directors is not enough; stockholders need to be able 
to adopt specific policies that management must implement. Even 
the many scholars who debate the utility of this approach to 
corporate governance share something critical with their rivals: 
the home field for the debate. 
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 As much as corporate law scholars fetishize the agency 
costs that flow from the separation of ownership and control in 
operating companies, they have been amazingly quiet about the 
“separation of ownership from ownership.” What I mean by that is 
that the equity of public corporations is often owned, not by 
the end-user investors, but by another form of agency, a mutual 
fund, or other institutional investor. It is these 
intermediaries who vote corporate stock and apply pressure to 
public company operating boards. I daresay that more American 
stockholders own equity in Fidelity- and Vanguard-controlled 
mutual funds than own stock in Microsoft or GE. But corporate 
law scholarship does not reflect that reality.  
The same corporate law scholars who would belittle the 
argument that the Wall Street rule is a sufficient protection 
for public company stockholders accept that argument as a good 
one when it comes to mutual fund investors. Admittedly, the 
scholars would say that the ability of mutual fund investors to 
get their money out at net asset value whenever they want gives 
them a protection that the stockholders of operating companies 
do not have. But that retort seems hollow. The net asset value 
of my mutual fund simply reflects the market value of its 
investments, most of which are in the stock of publicly traded 
operating corporations. As important, the idea that investors 
have more real choice in mutual fund investments than they have 
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in operating company investments is hardly self-evident. 
Likewise, it would be passing strange if corporate law scholars 
truly believed that professional money managers would, as a 
class, be less likely to exploit their agency than the managers 
of corporations that make products and deliver services.  
 Nonetheless, the corporate law scholarship of the last 25 
years obsesses over the agency costs of operating company 
boards, particularly in the mergers and acquisitions context. 
Little of it considers that the “empowerment” of stockholders 
does not empower end-user investors so much as it empowers 
intermediaries. Even less of it considers the political science 
of empowerment and the divisions that exist within the 
institutional investor community. Most corporate law scholars 
have not burdened their minds with the fact that 
undifferentiated empowerment of these so-called stockholders may 
disproportionately strengthen the hand of activist institutions 
that have short-term or non-financial objectives that are at 
odds with the interests of individual index fund investors. That 
proxy fights and derivative suits against money management 
boards are virtually unheard of under the “Business Trust” 
statutes that are prevalent in the governance of mutual funds is 
accepted by corporate law scholars with equanimity. But these 
same scholars claim the much greater number of such fights and 
suits against the board of operating companies is grossly 
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insufficient and a justification for reforms in the corporation 
law governing operating corporations.  
 The dearth of academic interest also flows from the 
relative difficulty of writing about institutional investors. 
Because public companies must disclose huge amounts of 
information about themselves, they are easy to study. 
Institutional investors are much harder to probe. 
 And let’s face it, mutual and pension funds are simply not 
as interesting as operating companies. Operating companies 
actually make things. They employ a lot of Americans. They have 
public faces. We are used to them being the focus of the key 
questions. 
 Compounding these problems is the reality that they affect 
the financial press even more than they affect academics. 
Tenured professors have the freedom to pursue projects that take 
years of tedious spadework. Financial journalists do not and 
often look to the academic community for inspiration. 
 There has probably never been a time when academic 
corporate lawyers have been more influential than they are now 
with the financial press. Ironically, that influence remains 
directed at the management of operating corporations, precisely 
when the traditional Berle-Means paradigm has fundamentally 
changed in favor of stockholders. No longer are the equity 
holders of public corporations diffuse and weak. Instead, the 
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equity holders of public corporations represent a new and 
powerful form of agency, which presents its own risks to both 
individual investors and more generally to the best interests of 
our nation. Academic and journalistic inertia are weakening the 
power of centralized management and ignoring the dangers of this 
new form of agency.  
 
“Professional” Independent Directors 
 
For much of the last 40 years, corporate law reformers have 
sought to increase the independence of corporate directors from 
top corporate managers, and to constitute corporate boards that 
are more accountable to stockholders. These “monitoring 
directors” are often idealized as platonic trustees, who are 
well-positioned to protect the best interests of the 
stockholders and corporate constituencies without worrying about 
their own personal self-interest. 
 Many of the reforms adopted in the wake of the Enron and 
Worldcom scandals involved mandates for corporate boards to 
undertake certain duties only through directors who meet newly 
strengthened definitions of independence. As a practical matter, 
these time-intensive functions and new definitions have 
influenced the typical composition of a public company’s board 
of directors. In order to meet all the functional mandates, 
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corporate boards need a large number of independent directors. 
Because of tightened, non-contextual independence standards, 
executives affiliated with industry partners or management have 
to take on a federally endorsed label of “non-independent” in 
order to serve, regardless of the expertise they might bring to 
bear on the ordinary decisions that regularly occupy top 
management. Increasingly, boards are comprised of one person who 
knows everything about the company and who has an intense 
interest in its future—the CEO—and nine or ten other people 
selected precisely because they have no possible interest in or 
connection to the company that might cause them to be perceived 
as conflicted—or that might cause them to have any genuine 
concern for the corporation’s future. 
 Many of these independent directors derive important 
elements of their net worth from board service. Because they 
have no real ties to any particular company, but a great deal of 
interest in their own futures, these directors are not anxious 
to incur the wrath of institutional investors and those who 
advise them. They fear that if they oppose an initiative to get 
rid of a takeover defense at company X, they will face withhold 
campaigns at companies Y and Z. With power dynamics changing 
toward activist institutional investors, independent directors 
who wish to remain in the game will seek to avoid the ire of 
ISS, the business op-ed commentators at the New York Times, and 
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so forth. Even active CEOs who serve on other corporate boards 
are subject to these pressures. The worst thing that a public 
company CEO can do is find himself the subject of bad press 
because of his resistance to a stockholder proposal directed at 
another company on whose board he sits. That unwanted attention 
could result in proposals directed at the company he manages on 
a daily basis, upsetting his board and distracting from his 
pursuit of the company’s business strategy. 
 For public company CEOs, these dynamics often mean that one 
has a board that is less equipped than it used to be to provide 
strategic advice, is pre-occupied with the completion of a long 
list of legal mandates, and is motivated and empowered to employ 
advisers who often urge and procure acceptance of the most 
cautious and costly method of addressing any risk, however 
trifling. Perhaps as important, these boards are anxious to 
compromise whenever the institutional investor community rattles 
toy sabers. Rather than trustees willing to sacrifice their 
offices over matters of principle, independent directors 
increasingly look more like elected officials, who rationalize 
away compromises in conviction on the basis that the good 
produced by their continued service justifies the accommodation 
of sub-optimal proposals when that is necessary to avoid 
electoral defeat. Better to get rid of the classified board, the 
poison pill, the plurality vote, and so on and so forth, than to 
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face a withhold campaign or proxy fight that could really do 
harm. 
 
The Globalization of Capital and Product Markets Without 
The Globalization of Externality Regulation 
 
It now seems quaint that workers in the Midwest and the 
northeastern United States used to fear wage competition from 
non-union labor in the South. Political scientists once fretted 
over the incentives individual American states had to compete 
with each other by lowering the standards expected of 
corporations in order to attract jobs, fearing that the self-
interest of states acting in isolation would undermine the 
greater good of the overall republic. Nearly as quaint are fears 
over competition from workers in Japan, which from any global 
perspective, is a progressive, wealthy nation with well-paid 
workers. 
 Now, the doors of the United States and Europe have been 
opened wide to products and capital from every corner of the 
world. The hurly-burly of capitalism has been globalized. But 
something else has not. 
 In the United States, Europe, Japan, and other developed 
nations, it was long ago realized that the unrestrained 
operation of private sector commercial activity was 
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unacceptable. Businesses did not internalize all their costs; to 
the contrary, disregard for the environment and the mistreatment 
of labor were as much the market rule, as the exception. The 
developed world therefore developed requirements for the 
responsible conduct of business, which restricted environmental 
degradation, protected the safety and dignity of labor, and 
ensured minimum wages and maximum hours. Along with those 
requirements, governments implemented social safety nets, 
designed to make sure that decent levels of housing, health 
care, education, and nutrition were available to all their 
citizens. Put in simple terms, there was a recognition that 
although market competition was a powerful force for the 
creation of societal wealth, its excesses and limitations had to 
be addressed if the optimal social outcomes were to result.  
 For what now seems to be a fleeting moment, it seemed that 
the West had hit upon an ideal balance, which left sufficient 
room for capitalistic dynamism while creating enviable standards 
of living for ordinary working people and historically 
unprecedented protections for the poor. Although the balance 
struck was not identical in each nation, the similarities in 
approach far exceeded the differences.  
 As we move deeper into the 21st century, this balanced 
approach is under extreme pressure. American corporations now 
face competition from nations whose economic and social 
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conditions are far different than our own. Within these nations, 
it is possible to engage in business conduct that violates 
widely accepted legal standards in the West, and that sinks even 
deeper beneath the normative floor the West sets for the 
ethically and socially responsible conduct of corporate affairs. 
That reality confronts American managers with ethically complex 
challenges. 
 It is frustrating enough to confront domestic competitors 
who employ “full-time part-time” workers and off-load the costs 
of their employees’ health care needs onto others. It is even 
more difficult to compete with businesses who locate operations 
in nations without functioning environmental standards, without 
protections for labor, and where the prevailing wages for 
skilled labor make the American minimum wage look generous. 
Although possible to rationalize as giving opportunities to the 
very poor in the developing world, the decision to confront such 
competition by off-shoring also frequently involves the knowing 
decision by a manager to hire labor under terms and conditions 
he would not want his children to endure.  
 The increased potency of institutional investors and their 
desire for measures to enhance stock price have put intense 
pressure on corporate managers to take cost-cutting measures. 
These measures—e.g., downsizing, off-shoring existing jobs, 
concentrating new job growth in low wage labor markets, or 
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limiting domestic wage and benefit growth—drive a wedge between 
labor and management. Indeed, as CEOs strive to and are rewarded 
for pleasing the equity markets through cost-cutting measures, 
they may face the most withering outrage from middle managers, 
who are expected to do more with less at the workplace and who 
face greater insecurity in employment, at the same time as 
they’ve seen CEO pay soaring to unprecedented levels. Who wants 
to bet whether most of Lou Dobbs’s audience wears a white 
collar? 
 
Despite High Wages, CEOs Are Not Enjoying Their Jobs 
 
But middle managers are not the only ones feeling insecure. 
CEOs themselves face greater prospects of termination.  
 Not only that, CEOs don’t seem to be having fun. Having to 
explain to employees why the corporation is off-shoring jobs and 
increasing the employees’ share of health insurance costs, 
having to be lectured by a twenty-something analyst about a 
penny miss in the quarterly earnings, and having to consider at 
board meetings cosmetic measures to improve the corporation’s 
corporate governance ratings lest the corporation be subject to 
an array of shareholder proposals—these are really fun things to 
do. Add to that the increased focus on regulatory compliance 
arising out of the scandals of the turn of the century. Then top 
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it off with a high level of public cynicism about CEO pay and 
integrity. Put it all together and being a public company CEO 
isn’t what it used to be.  
 For that reason, it should not be surprising to see CEOs 
seeking solace in high pay or, more recently, in the loving arms 
of private equity buyers. Ironic though it is, private equity 
investors are now viewed as the nurturing providers of patient 
capital compared to the public equity markets. Through an 
alliance with private equity, top managers can give the public 
stockholders an exit premium, avoid the quarter-to-quarter 
earnings madness, make a boatload of money for themselves 
upfront, off load the need to deal with professional independent 
directors who constantly fret about ISS and the business press, 
lower their own public profile, and hope to at least chart a 
course for the enterprise by which progress is measured over 
years rather than months. Hence, the current wave of MBOs, which 
take large public companies private. 
 These and other ingredients have cooked up a volatile stew 
of discontent. Workers and ordinary investors feel that CEOs are 
selfish and taking outrageous pay at a time when other Americans 
are economically insecure. Independent directors are scared and 
weary, bending under the pressure of being the fulcrum between 
management and stockholder activists and under the weight of 
their post-Sarbanes-Oxley regulatory workload. CEOs feel 
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embattled, disrespected, and subject to the short-term whims of 
the stock market, institutional investors, regulators, and even 
their own now more politically independent directors.   
 I’m not naïve enough to believe that there is any corporate 
governance agenda that will eliminate these feelings; many of 
them arise out of larger economic trends well beyond the 
influence of corporate law and, as important, out of the natural 
clash of interests among labor, management, and investors. But I 
do perceive that there are important areas of common concern 
where management and labor could come together to create a 
corporate governance structure that better fosters mutual 
interest in sustainable economic growth. 
 In the remaining minutes, I will outline a few of those 
areas. I do so not so much to advocate specific solutions, but 
to identify what seem to me to be common complaints and goals of 
these corporate constituencies. In identifying these areas, I 
will risk noting where one constituency or the other must give a 
bit in order to get something it desires. 
 
Common Ground for Management and Labor? 
Settling the Continued Takeover/Corporate Election Hoo-ha 
 
I confess to being amazed at the energy that is still 
poured into the subject of whether American corporations are 
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subject to a vigorous enough market for corporate control. 
Isolated anecdotes of market failure of course exist, but the 
history of the last quarter century reflects the dynamism of the 
American mergers and acquisitions market, with corporate law 
acting as an effective goad to corporate boards to be open to 
combinations and sales proposals attractive to stockholders. 
Though there may be deficiencies in the American system of 
corporate governance, the absence of opportunities for sell-side 
stockholders to receive acquisition premia hardly seems one of 
them. Yet, for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is 
how fun hostile takeover activity is to observers and how 
comparatively easy it is for corporate law scholars to write 
about takeover defenses than deeper problems of corporate 
performance, the issue of takeover defenses still preoccupies 
the corporate governance debate. 
 Into this mix throw the proposals to create greater 
accountability over the boards of corporations that, because of 
their size or because of regulatory issues, were not subject to 
the market for corporate control. The shareholder access 
proposal still being bandied about at the SEC was most 
convincingly supported by the argument that indexed investors 
should have a tool to influence the composition of large 
corporations that perform poorly over an extended period of time 
because selling wasn’t a real option for indexed investors. 
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Notably, the shareholder access proposal as originally conceived 
required the actual nomination of rival candidates by 
stockholders who had held corporate stock for at least a year. 
 As we now know, shareholder access has gone nowhere. But 
that does not mean that management won. To the contrary, 
institutional investors used their influence to obtain a less 
responsible and arguably more potent weapon to change the 
composition of the board, the conversion of a decision to 
“withhold authority” from a member of the management slate into 
an effective no vote. With this weapon in hand, institutional 
investors can pit the incumbent board against a platform of 
generalized outrage, with the very real threat that generalized 
outrage will win. This weapon does not require institutional 
investors to name actual candidates who will assume the 
fiduciary duties that come with board service; it simply 
requires them to advocate that the bums should be tossed out. 
Independent directors are now running scared of withhold 
campaigns, and increasingly ready to make the bargains necessary 
to avoid being targeted. This fear permeates the system as 
professional independent directors wish to avoid controversy on 
all their boards.  
 For long-term investors, labor, and management, the ad hoc 
and constantly changing arrangements being worked out by the 
call and shout of the stockholder proposal process are less than 
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ideal. A more durable and rational system of accountability 
might be attractive. 
 That could be built around the following elements:  
 
1. Abandon Classified Boards But Keep Traditional Poison Pills 
 
As current trends show, boards are—for better or worse—
increasingly giving up their classified structures, and once 
given up, those structures will not return. Given the 
receptivity of independent directors to attractive takeover 
bids, classified boards have almost never kept a corporation 
independent in the face of a premium bid. On the other hand, it 
is crazy from an investor’s perspective for a target board not 
to have a traditional pill in place to stimulate a value-
enhancing auction and to deter structurally coercive bids. An M 
& A pact where management would support the elimination of 
classified boards and long-term investors would accept 
traditional poison pills might settle this question in a stable 
way. 
 
2. Create a Rational Corporate Election and Accountability 
System 
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Management must accept the reality that investors will 
continue to demand a greater ability to hold boards accountable. 
The current corporate election system remains difficult for 
outsiders to use, in the absence of a takeover bid. At the same 
time, institutional investors slight the disruptive effect that 
electoral contests and withhold campaigns have on corporations. 
Corporate elections are a means to an end, not ends in 
themselves. Current trends are toward the implementation of a 
Rube Goldberg system of accountability, whereby activist 
institutional investors can use the threat of a withhold 
campaign to bargain for concessions and the seating of some of 
their favorites by action of the incumbent slate. This arguably 
smacks of green mail and a hidden form of cumulative voting, the 
benefits of which arguably flow largely to short-term activist 
investors. 
 For long-term investors and management, there might be 
gains to be made by reforming the corporate election process to 
provide for greater access periodically, say every three years. 
This access could be made available only to investors who have 
held their shares for at least a year and who are not bidders 
for control, and could involve the reimbursement of solicitation 
expenses for any rival slate that gains a material percentage of 
the votes. By this means, corporate boards would be subject to 
the greater possibility of electoral defeat on a regular, but 
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not annual, basis.2 In exchange for this access, management could 
demand a restoration of the plurality voting system, on the 
reasonable ground that stockholders now have a means to 
influence board composition by using the responsible means of 
naming a rival slate of actual people willing to serve on the 
board. 
 
3. No More Pizza on the Wall 
  
Consistent with the objective of implementing a responsible 
and efficient system of accountability, the costly precatory 
proposal process could be brought to a long-overdue halt. 
Instead of a pretend polity, stockholders would do real things. 
If they have a proposal to make, it would be in the form of a 
bylaw with real effect. In the case where the validity of a 
bylaw is doubtful, stockholders would be granted access to the 
corporation’s proxy by the SEC and the SEC would leave it to 
state adjudicators to answer the underlying question. In a real 
corporate republic with a vibrant election process, proxy access 
for stockholders seeking to propose bylaws, and strong voting 
power for stockholders over important transactions, where 
management is also disciplined by an active market for corporate 
                                              
2 In other writings, I have explained that the enhanced process 
could be used annually at corporations with classified boards.  
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control, there would be little justification for the continued 
cost of throwing pizzas at corporate boards every year.  
 
4. Quiet The CEO Pay Furor 
  
There is a great deal that can be said about CEO pay. I’m 
not going there today.  
What I do venture is that management and labor are both 
poorly served by the lack of a more durable resolution of this 
controversy. Right now, some individual corporations in concert 
with certain institutional investors are toying with allowing 
their stockholders to cast advisory votes on executive pay, à la 
the English system. That would be a steroid–fueled growth in the 
muscle of stockholders. Traditional corporate lawyers, most 
notably Martin Lipton, rightly fear that this might be a near 
fatal slice toward the “death by a thousand cuts” corporate 
boards seem to be accepting. Mr. Lipton is also correct to fear 
the more general phenomenon of eroding board authority. But the 
question is whether corporations can stop the nicks without more 
collective action by groups like the Business Roundtable, so 
that corporate managers as a class get something substantial in 
exchange for the concessions they are now constantly making 
individually. 
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In the context of a larger reform to create a rationally 
balanced system of corporate accountability, it might be worth 
considering the admittedly large step of permitting stockholders 
to adopt non-repealable bylaws requiring that the employment 
contracts of top executives be subject to stockholder approval. 
When this means is combined with an enhanced corporate election 
system, stockholders would have a more potent ability to check 
any employment practices they perceive as overreaching. To 
improve the informational base stockholders would have to 
consider whether to use that new tool, additional disclosure 
requirements might be implemented to place top executive pay in 
fuller context—for example, by comparing that pay in present and 
historical terms to the median pay provided to the corporation’s 
workers and to the returns received by the corporation’s 
stockholders. 
 The government is poorly positioned to set CEO pay. If 
stockholders are granted the practical ability to balance cost 
and morale concerns against the need for top-flight executive 
talent, they will not only have more ability to hold 
compensation committees accountable, but will also themselves 
bear accountability for the incentives they approve. As a 
 33
result, one might hope that CEO pay would lose much of its 
enervating salience as a political issue.3
 But if corporate boards accede on major ideas like these in 
isolation, these ideas will do little to calm the waters for 
management. The business community is playing a prevent defense 
in a game without a clock. At some point, the mantra of “more, 
more, more” reform has to stop. If executive pay, takeovers, and 
elections have all been addressed in a way that creates greater 
accountability, will institutional investors back off on 
precatory proposals? On the withhold vote? 
 To stop the slide and push the debate toward more 
rationality, management needs labor. For its part, labor needs 
to remember that as much cheap momentary pleasure as continued 
stories of CEO discomfort brings, labor ultimately loses if 
American corporations become bad replicas of high school Model 
U.N. convocations.  
 
5. Give Managers and Directors More Time to Focus on Business 
  
                                              
3 As a social issue, however, it is absurd to think that capital— 
in the form of stockholders—will address the concerns over CEO 
pay of those who see top executive pay as a symptom of a larger 
problem of growing income inequality.  I suspect much of the 
sentiment for congressional legislation has more to do with that 
issue of wage inequality, rather than with a concern that 
stockholders are suffering from excessive CEO pay. 
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The major scandals that drove the adoption of Sarbanes-
Oxley and the exchange rule reforms of 2002 were all 
characterized by a common factor—top manager greed exploited a 
stock market that fixated on accounting earnings, however odd 
the source of their generation. Unlike some, I concede that 
there were valuable aspects to the 2002 reforms. 
 But taken in their entirety, those reforms have put 
enormous time pressures on corporate boards and managers. 
Although the scandals that gave rise to the reforms all were 
caused by misconduct by top managers, the 404 process has caused 
countless hours of work at the lowest managerial levels of 
public companies, with the accounting industry becoming the 
ironic beneficiaries of its own prior failure and, according to 
much lore, encouraging (nay, nearly demanding) that its issuer 
clients implement onerous internal control processes to address 
any and all risks.  
At the same time, the exchange rules have created a large 
laundry list of tasks that only committees comprised entirely of 
independent directors must accomplish. These tasks are time-
consuming and detract from the ability of public corporations to 
maintain small, cohesive boards that spend quality time in 
plenary session discussing big-picture strategic issues. 
Tightened, across-the-board, labels of non-independence 
discourage service by those with affiliations to the company, 
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even if they would be extremely useful in helping the 
corporation establish and implement a sound strategy for long-
term profitability. 
Trimming back anything called reform is always politically 
risky. But with labor’s support for a constructive, fresh look, 
the political environment for a tailoring of some mandates would 
be more hospitable. Although labor has a strong interest in 
preventing a future spate of governance meltdowns, it also has 
an interest in ensuring that corporate boards and managers can 
spend most of their time in the constructive effort of trying to 
make their companies’ business strategies succeed, rather than 
on the completion of a mind-numbing checklist of regulatory 
mandates. Having smart people with useful industry experience 
serve on boards would seem to be of value to workers dependent 
on the competitiveness of American corporations.4
For its part, the Business Roundtable could ground its 
request for 404 relief in an important confession. By admitting 
that its members were at the center of the scandals that gave 
                                              
4 Similarly, Section 11 of the federal securities laws deters 
persons of independent wealth from serving as independent 
directors on public boards, because those persons may be 
subjected to costly proceedings and potential liability even 
when they have not acted with an illicit state of mind.  
Bringing Section 11 into line with other federal statutes and 
allowing independent directors to be dismissed as defendants 
unless the plaintiffs plead scienter on their part would address 
this problem in a responsible way, consistent with labor’s 
interests. 
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rise to 404 and that middle managers had nothing to do with 
those scandals, the Roundtable could stimulate a restructuring 
of 404 to focus it more discretely and cost-effectively on the 
need to have tight internal controls to prevent fraud by the top 
management of corporations and to relieve burdens at lower 
levels of corporations.  A way to do this could be to mandate 
the adequacy of internal controls designed to: 1) prevent fraud 
by top officers; and 2) address risks meeting a rational 
materiality threshold like 5% of firm value, thereby freeing up 
directors to use their business judgment regarding the utility 
and intensity of lower-level internal control processes. 
  
6. Temper the Influence of Short-term Stockholders 
 
Management and labor have legitimate reasons to distrust 
activist short-term investors who seek to influence corporate 
policy. When a bidder for control wins, it owns the company and 
becomes responsible for its fate. When investors run a proxy 
fight and elect a new board, the new directors become 
fiduciaries accountable to the stockholders for their conduct. 
But when an activist investor uses the influence of a withhold 
campaign to get a corporate board to change its strategy, 
succeeds in that endeavor, and then sells out its position, that 
investor is accountable to no one if the corporation later 
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falters because of the change in strategy it advanced. The 
company’s long-term investors, management, and labor are left 
eating the activists’ cooking.  
 To address some of the legitimate concerns arising from the 
activism of short-term investors, management and labor might 
consider ideas along these lines: i) reforming the disclosure 
laws to require the disclosure of short positions on a basis at 
least on par with the requirements for the disclosure of long 
positions and, in general, to make clearer the directional 
interest large investors have in an issuer; and ii) conditioning 
the right to file stockholder proposals or seek books and 
records on a sworn certification that the stockholder has held a 
net long position in the issuer for some reasonable prior 
period. Requirements like these would be based on the premise 
that only stockholders with some demonstrated commitment to the 
best interests of the corporation should be able to use these 
potent rights. Moreover, by giving the market better information 
about short and hedged positions, pure long investors could 
better assess the economic motives for the proposals of activist 
investors and the judiciary could more accurately determine how 
much cleansing effect should be given to particular stockholder 
votes. 
 
7. Reduce the Focus on Quarterly Earnings Estimates 
 38
 
No rational person believes that corporations can deliver 
consistent, quarter-to-quarter earnings growth nor that 
corporations should be managed with that objective in mind. The 
concept that all information materially enhances the ability of 
the marketplace to make rational judgments has never been 
accepted as the basis for American legal doctrine; rather, 
judgments about reliability permeate the federal securities 
laws. 
 Management and labor might therefore usefully press for a 
requirement that quarterly earnings estimates be deemed 
misleading and therefore prohibited unless they come in the 
context of a fully disclosed long-term plan for the growth of 
corporate earnings. Absent their placement in that more 
disciplined, rational context, quarterly earnings estimates 
provide little that is of value to investors but continue to 
contribute to managing to the market. Managing to the market was 
characteristic of Enron, Worldcom, HealthSouth, and other 
companies that contributed to market meltdown. Isolated issuer 
restraint is of little utility as competitive realities lead to 
collective idiocy, as CEOs fear the loss of analyst coverage if 
they refuse to feed the market beast and their competitors 
continue to do so. Less drastic means to get at this would be 
initiatives within the Business Roundtable to encourage 
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industry-wide decisions to move away from quarterly earnings 
estimates to annual estimates of a range of possible results. 
Whatever their precise form, the goal would be clear: to enable 
managers to focus more on sustainable, long-term corporate 
growth and less on meeting the market’s short-term expectations.  
 
8. Confront The Agency Problem Of Institutional Investors 
 
Although the economic power of institutional investors has 
grown enormously, corporate and securities laws continue to 
focus obsessively on operating companies. This ignores the 
reality that most Americans invest in funds controlled by 
institutional investors, rather than in operating companies. 
Even more important, it ignores that institutional investors are 
regularly seeking to and succeeding in influencing the policies 
of operating companies. Therefore, these intermediaries are 
exercising economic clout in a manner that affects the tens of 
millions of Americans who work for and invest (directly or 
indirectly) in those corporations. 
 Problematically, those institutional investors whose goals 
are most in line with ordinary Americans—those that manage index 
funds—have rational reasons to be as inert as possible when it 
comes to voting shares and influencing issuer behavior. 
Meanwhile, those institutions with short-term or political 
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objectives often have the loudest voice. And many traditional 
money managers, such as mutual funds, would just as soon 
dispense with their votes altogether. They therefore look to 
proxy advisory firms, such as ISS and Glass Lewis, in order to 
give them a rational basis for explaining their voting decisions 
if questioned about their compliance with ERISA standards. 
 Oddly, some mutual fund companies even brag about the fact 
that the folks who make their voting decisions are different 
from the ones who invest the money. Strange indeed. So too is 
the fact that huge amounts of time and not insignificant dollars 
are now spent by institutional investors in determining how to 
vote on the blizzard of precatory proposals now on the ballots 
at public company annual meetings. Much of this cost flows from 
the legal requirement that institutional investors vote shares 
in an informed manner. 
 But that does not mean that the voting is done in a way 
that rationally advances the interest of long-term investors. 
For example, a large index fund complex told me that it voted on 
a huge corporate merger on a single-issuer basis—voting its 
shares of the target for the merger and its shares of the 
(larger) market-cap acquirer against the deal — without 
considering whether the merger was in the best interests of 
investors in the fund as a whole, taking into account that the 
fund owned both of the issuers that were proposing to merge. 
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Likewise, another mutual fund complex told me that it takes into 
account the potential for financial fraud (think Enron) by 
short-weighting fishy stocks in its actively managed funds. When 
I asked whether the information was shared with the managers of 
their index funds and whether that triggered activism against 
the issuers whose disclosures generated concerns about fraud or 
managed earnings, the complex basically said no, nothing was 
done to protect the indexed investors. 
 Of similar concern is the reality that the entities that 
provide proxy voting advice and corporate governance ratings are 
not subject to the same disclosure requirements as public 
operating companies. At least one of the major firms that 
advises institutional investors on how to vote also sells its 
services to issuers. These firms also do not make clear how 
their corporate governance ratings actually work. Perhaps there 
has been some recent change, but in the recent past, it was true 
that for issuers to determine how a particular change in 
corporate governance would affect their ratings from one 
service, they had to pay the firm that doled out the ratings. It 
was impossible for them to tell from the publicly available 
information because the firm’s rating criteria was not made 
public in a clear way. 
 This issue is undoubtedly complex. But one can rationally 
question a system where it appears that the institutional 
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investors most active in pressuring issuers are pursuing 
investment strategies at odds with the core principle of the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis and those who are pursuing 
the most rational strategy are the most silent. As disturbing is 
the idea that the practical power to influence a large 
percentage of the corporate vote has been outsourced to entities 
that have no accountability to the public. 
 Although management interests are chary about admitting it, 
the American business establishment has long ago realized that 
regulation of economic power was inevitable and that such 
regulation must be even-handed. Right now, the managers of 
public operating companies are tightly regulated, yet those who 
govern institutional investors are comparatively free from 
public scrutiny. 
 For both managers and labor, it might be useful to control 
this form of agency as well and to ensure that institutional 
investors’ conduct is better aligned with the best interests of 
long-term investors. Given the mountains of 401(k) money that 
American workers, as a practical matter, will entrust to these 
firms for generations, the utility of considering measures to 
guarantee greater alignment seems self-evident to anyone who has 
listened to corporate law scholars beat the agency cost drum. 
Avenues for exploration could include requirements for 
institutional investors (in particular, index funds) to: focus 
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on indicators of possible fraud or firm failure in making 
investment and voting decisions, align the compensation 
incentives of their management personnel with the investment 
horizons of long-term investors, and vote on mergers in a manner 
that takes into account whether the fund owns shares of both 
parties to the merger. In tandem with this could be the 
consideration of requirements prohibiting mutual and pension 
funds from utilizing proxy voting recommendations services 
unless those services publicly disclose: i) the revenues they 
receive from public companies and institutional investors, and 
the nature of the work that generates those revenues; and ii) 
the process used by them to develop their corporate governance 
ratings for corporations and directors, including the specific 
criteria and weighting they use to calculate the specific 
ratings given to corporations and directors.  
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9. Encourage Investment and Discourage Churning 
 
One of the primary arguments made by mutual fund complexes 
against activism by their index funds is based on cost. If index 
funds spend resources to be active, informed stockholders, that 
makes it harder for the funds to match the market return. 
Because investors are paying for a market return and giving up 
prospects for outsized returns, index funds worry about being 
undercut by competitors. I realize that the patron saint of 
index investing, John Bogle, believes that the mutual fund 
industry’s cost excuses for failing to be more informed, active 
stockholders, are largely unconvincing. But doubtless there are 
real competitive pressures that do cut against any particular 
mutual fund complex acting in isolation. It is for that very 
reason that regulation to require all index funds to make a 
baseline effort might be useful, as it addresses this factor. 
 Given the gaping federal deficit and a variety of social 
needs that management and long-term investors would acknowledge 
as requiring attention, an additional leveling strategy might 
well be considered. That would involve ideas to raise revenue by 
addressing short-term trading strategies. These could involve 
higher capital gains taxes on stock held for less than two years 
or a very small percentage tax on securities trades. By these 
means, the budget and social investment chasm that threatens our 
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long-term economic vitality could be narrowed in a livable way 
that also has the utility of providing a comparative advantage 
to institutional investors who act like investors, rather than 
gamblers.  
I’ll finish with two issues—health insurance and 
globalization—that might strike some of you as a bit beyond the 
traditional domain of so-called corporate governance. Perhaps 
that is true. But it is also unrealistic to think that the 
frustrations and fear of working Americans facing these issues 
will not influence how their labor and pension funds act as 
stockholders. A present and future where good jobs are available 
in the United States is vital to labor. If management is not 
perceived as caring about that objective, it should not be 
surprised to see discontent come out sideways, through 
nettlesome stockholder proposals that tweak CEOs where it hurts. 
 
10. Eliminate the Connection Between Health Insurance Access and 
Employment at a Particular Corporation 
 
Managers and labor want American corporations to be 
competitive and to provide quality employment opportunities for 
generations to come. To these ends, both realize that many 
workers currently depend on employer-sponsored health insurance 
to protect themselves and their families. Likewise, both 
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recognize that workers cannot rationally expect to work for only 
one corporation for an entire career. Both also realize that 
responsible corporations that provide health insurance face 
competitive pressures from corporations that don’t provide those 
benefits and from corporations domiciled in nations where the 
costs of providing health coverage are socialized. Consequently, 
management and labor have a shared interest in pursuing long 
overdue action on this front.  
As a starting point, the Business Roundtable and AFL-CIO 
could declare a mutual pox on anyone who uses tired nostrums 
like “socialized medicine” in order to stifle reform to provide 
Americans with affordable access to a choice of health insurance 
plans through a means not tied to employment at any particular 
firm. There is room for a healthy debate, but advocacy that 
distorts and misrepresents the issues simply delays sorely 
needed progress. By deciding what level of access we, as a 
decent people, expect all our citizens to have, and implementing 
that commitment in a more rational way that is not employer-
specific, our nation can both free up American corporations to 
compete more effectively and relieve American workers of the 
worry that a change in employment will put their families’ 
health at risk. Not only that, progress on this front could 
provide a foundation for action to address related issues, such 
as the question of how our corporations, and nation, manage to 
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remain competitive and provide for the needs of working 
Americans and their families when we have to bear the full 
burden of addressing the retirement obligations owed to the baby 
boomers. Common to many other looming issues is the extent to 
which employer-specific means of meeting important safety net 
objectives should persist or whether more portable means of 
access can be developed, which provide workers with economic 
security but don’t reduce the competitiveness of specific 
corporations. 
 
A Management-Labor Commitment to Globalizing 
Enlightened Externality Regulation 
 
There was a time in the not too distant past when American 
management and labor took great pride in the American approach 
to economic affairs, as providing a model that, in contrast to 
communism, delivered real benefits to labor through a system 
that balanced the dynamism of market behavior with important 
protections for labor, communities, and the environment. As 
developing nations become huge players in world capital and 
product markets, the United States, and the West writ large, 
have a compelling interest in helping those nations implement 
the shared lessons of our capitalist history. To support the 
globalization of enlightened standards of labor and 
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environmental protection, for example, is not to be against the 
amorphous concept of “free trade”; it is to acknowledge that 
there was good reason for the Western world to temper market 
behavior with regulation to protect vulnerable workers and the 
environment. Human ingenuity ought to be sufficient for the 
West—with strong, joint United States and European leadership—to 
figure out how to foster globalized trade without compromising 
the core aspects of our enlightened approach to capitalism. It 
is doubtful social progress for American managers to find 
themselves unable to match competitors whose production 
facilities are free to engage in grotesque pollution and whose 
workers have no right to organize and no genuine political 
freedom. And only the most hubristic and selfish American 
managers can pretend that only low-skilled American and European 
workers are at risk from the globalization of trade without the 
globalization of externality regulation. If they care about job 
opportunities for their children, which I assume they do, top 
executives should care about guaranteeing that all competitors 
in trade have to meet decent standards of responsible behavior 
toward workers and the environment. 
 In pursuing the global implementation of an enlightened 
capitalism and in honoring its principles in their daily 
management decisions, American CEOs would also begin to rebuild 
some of the public regard they have lost during the past few 
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decades. The more they are viewed as genuinely striving to 
generate profits in a manner that reflects a genuine concern for 
the well-being of the nation that charters their corporations, 
the communities in which their corporations operate, and the 
workers who toil for them, the more the public will respect 
them.  
*  *  * 
 This menu of areas for joint management-labor cooperation 
is half-baked at best, I admit. But that is not so important. 
What is important is that a more serious endeavor to reach 
common ground regarding corporate governance be undertaken 
between those who purport to speak for American managers and 
those who speak for labor. Unless management and labor recognize 
their common interests, both may see trivial corporate 
governance turmoil and short-term market pressures detract from 
the long-term pursuit of corporate profit and job growth.  
 America’s public corporations are not playthings. They are 
societally chartered institutions of enormous importance and 
value. Those who govern them ought to be accountable for the 
generation of durable wealth for stockholders. But the system of 
accountability must be a rational one that supports wealth 
creation within a system of enlightened capitalism. The 
management of public corporations should be given the space to 
implement sound long-term plans to make money by selling useful 
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products and services without the distraction of constant tumult 
from transient stockholders with short-term interests and a 
corporate governance industry that reaps profits from the 
perpetuation of strife.  
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